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Abstract
Darwiche and Pearl’s seminal 1997 article outlined a number
of baseline principles for a logic of iterated belief revision.
These principles, the DP postulates, have been supplemented
in a number of alternative ways. Most suggestions have re-
sulted in a form of ‘reductionism’ that identifies belief states
with orderings of worlds. However, this position has recently
been criticised as being unacceptably strong. Other proposals,
such as the popular principle (P), aka ‘Independence’, charac-
teristic of ‘admissible’ operators, remain commendably more
modest. In this paper, we supplement the DP postulates and
(P) with a number of novel conditions. While the DP pos-
tulates constrain the relation between a prior and a poste-
rior conditional belief set, our new principles notably govern
the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets ob-
tained from a common prior by different revisions. We show
that operators from the resulting family, which subsumes both
lexicographic and restrained revision, can be represented as
relating belief states associated with a ‘proper ordinal inter-
val’ (POI) assignment, a structure more fine-grained than a
simple ordering of worlds. We close the paper by noting that
these operators satisfy iterated versions of many AGM era
postulates, including Superexpansion, that are not sound for
admissible operators in general.
1 Introduction
Darwiche & Pearl’s (1997) seminal paper put forward a
number of now popular baseline principles of iterated be-
lief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been
strengthened in various manners. Most proposals for doing
so–such as natural (Boutilier 1996), lexicographic (Nayak,
Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003), and restrained (Booth and
Meyer 2006) revision (see (Peppas 2014) for an overview)–
have yielded sets of principles strong enough to entail
the following strong ‘reductionist’ principle: the set of be-
liefs held by an agent after a sequence of two revisions is
fully determined by the agent’s single-step revision dispo-
sitions. This thesis can alternatively be cashed out in terms
of an identification of belief states, the relata of the revi-
sion function, with total preorders (TPO’s) over possible
worlds. Booth & Chandler (2017) have however recently
provided considerations that suggest this reductionist posi-
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
tion to be too strong. Other supplements to the DP postu-
lates, however, have fallen short of having such a conse-
quence. This is true of the popular principle termed ‘(P)’
by Booth & Meyer (2006) and ‘Independence’ by Jin &
Thielscher (2007), which, together with the DP postulates,
characterises the family of ‘admissible’ revision operators
that includes both lexicographic and restrained operators but
excludes Boutilier’s natural ones.
In this paper, we supplement both the DP postulates and
(P) with a number of novel conditions. While the DP pos-
tulates constrain the relation between a prior and a poste-
rior conditional belief set, our new principles notably gov-
ern the relation between two posterior conditional belief sets
obtained from a common prior by different revisions. We
take as our foil two postulates of this variety considered by
Booth & Meyer (2011). These characterised a family of non-
prioritised revision operators, for which they offered a rep-
resentation in terms of what we shall call ‘proper ordinal in-
terval assignments’. Here, we show that these two postulates
become implausible in the context of prioritised revision,
which is the focus of the present paper. First of all, they turn
out to characterise lexicographic revision when one supple-
ments the remaining postulates of Booth & Meyer, i.e. (P)
and the DP postulates, with the AGM postulate of Success.
Secondly, they fall prey to an intuitive class of counterex-
ample. After noting this, we then consider two, more plau-
sible, weaker counterparts that have not yet been discussed
in the literature. We show that these can be obtained from
Booth & Meyer’s construction by adding a ‘naturalisation’
step. This is essentially an application of Boutillier’s natural
revision operation to the posterior TPO obtained by Booth
& Meyer’s method of non-prioritised revision. We call the
resulting family of iterated revision operators, which sub-
sumes both lexicographic and restrained revision operators,
the family of ‘Proper Ordinal Interval (POI)’ operators and
offer semantic and syntactic characterisations thereof. We
close the paper by noting that POI revision operators satisfy
iterated versions of a large number of AGM era postulates,
including Superexpansion.
The plan of the remainder of the article is as follows. In
Section 2, we first introduce some basic terminology and
definitions. Section 3 recapitulates Booth & Meyer’s frame-
work and introduces its two key postulates. These postulates
are then critically discussed in Section 4. Section 5 outlines
our construction of the POI family of operators. In Section
6, we discuss the weakenings of Booth & Meyer’s postu-
lates that are satisfied by the members of our new family.
In Section 7, the family is then characterised semantically
and syntactically, in two different manners. We wrap up the
paper with a fairly substantial discussion, in Section 8, of
the extent to which the members of the POI family satisfy
extensions of various strong AGM era postulates to the iter-
ated case. We then conclude in Section 9.
Due to space limitations, proofs or proof sketches are
only provided for a small subset of the propositions and
theorems stated. The appendix contains a detailed sketch
of the proof of what is arguably our main result (Theo-
rem 2). The remainder of the proofs are available in an
extended version of the paper, which can be accessed at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1807.09942.
2 Preliminaries
The beliefs of an agent are represented by a belief state Ψ. Ψ
determines a belief set [Ψ], a deductively closed set of sen-
tences, drawn from a finitely generated propositional, truth-
functional language L. Logical equivalence is denoted by ≡
and the set of logical consequences of Γ ⊆ L by Cn(Γ).
The set of propositional worlds is denoted by W , and the
set of models of a given sentence A is denoted by [[A]]. We
shall occasionally use x to denote, not the world x, but an
arbitrary sentence whose set of models is {x}.
In terms of belief dynamics, our principal focus is on it-
erated revision–rather than contraction–operators, which re-
turn, for any prior belief state Ψ and consistent sentence A,
the posterior belief state Ψ ∗ A that results from an adjust-
ment of Ψ to accommodate the inclusion of A in [Ψ].
The function ∗ is assumed to satisfy the AGM postu-
lates (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985; Dar-
wiche and Pearl 1997)–henceforth ‘AGM’, for short–which
notably include the postulate of Success (A ∈ [Ψ ∗A]). This
ensures the following convenient representability of single-
shot revision: each Ψ has associated with it a total preorder
Ψ over W such that [[[Ψ ∗ A]]] = min(Ψ, [[A]]) (Katsuno
and Mendelzon 1991; Grove 1988). This ordering is some-
times interpreted in terms of relative ‘(im)plausibility’, so
that x Ψ y iff x is considered more ‘plausible’ than y in
state Ψ. In this context, Success corresponds to the require-
ment that min(Ψ∗A,W ) ⊆ [[A]].
The single-shot revision dispositions associated with Ψ
can also be represented by a ‘conditional belief set’ [Ψ]c.
This set extends the belief set [Ψ] by further including var-
ious ‘conditional beliefs’, of the form A ⇒ B, where
⇒ is a non-truth-functional conditional connective. This is
achieved by means of the so-called Ramsey Test, according
to which A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ]c iff B ∈ [Ψ ∗A].
Following convention, we shall call principles couched in
terms of belief sets ‘syntactic’, and principles couched in
terms of TPOs ‘semantic’. The principles that we will dis-
cuss will be given in both types of format, with the distinc-
tion reflected in the nomenclature by the use of a subscript
‘’ to denote semantic principles.
We shall also be touching on a broader class of non-
prioritised iterated ‘revision’ operators, for which Success
does not necessarily hold. These will be denoted by the sym-
bol ◦. To avoid ambiguity, we will follow a convention of
superscripting every principle governing a belief change op-
erator with the relevant operator symbol (here: ∗ or ◦).
Finally, ∗ will be assumed to satisfy a principle of irrele-
vance of syntax that we shall call ‘Equivalence’:
(Eq∗) If A ≡ B and C ≡ D, then
[(Ψ ∗A) ∗ C] = [(Ψ ∗B) ∗D]
or semantically
(Eq∗) If A ≡ B, then Ψ∗A=Ψ∗B
as well as the DP postulates, which constrain the belief set
resulting from two successive revisions, or, equivalently, the
conditional belief set resulting from a single revision:
(C1∗) If A ∈ Cn(B), then [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B]
(C2∗) If ¬A ∈ Cn(B), then [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗B]
(C3∗) If A ∈ [Ψ ∗B], then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
(C4∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗B], then ¬A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
whose semantic counterparts are given by:
(C1∗) If x, y ∈ [[A]], then x Ψ∗A y iff x Ψ y
(C2∗) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]], then x Ψ∗A y iff x Ψ y
(C3∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x ≺Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y
(C4∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x Ψ y, then x Ψ∗A y
In fact we shall further assume that ∗ satisfies the principle
(P∗), which strengthens both (C3∗) and (C4∗):
(P∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗B], then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
Its semantic counterpart is given by:
(P∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x Ψ y, then x ≺Ψ∗A y
Satisfaction of AGM, (Eq∗), (C1∗), (C2∗) and (P∗) means
that ∗ is an ‘admissible’ revision operator, in the sense of
(Booth and Meyer 2006).
The constraints considered so far are notably satisfied by
two well-known kinds of revision operators: restrained oper-
ators and lexicographic operators.1 In semantic terms, these
both promote the minimal A-worlds in the prior TPO to
become minimal worlds in the posterior TPO. Regarding
the rest of the ordering, restrained revision operators pre-
serve the strict ordering ≺Ψ while additionally making ev-
ery A-world x strictly lower ranked than every ¬A-world
y for which x ∼Ψ y (where ∼Ψ is the symmetric closure
of Ψ), so that x Ψ∗A y iff: (i) x ∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]), or
(ii) x, y /∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]) and either (a) x ≺Ψ y or (b)
x ∼Ψ y and (x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]]). Lexicographic revi-
sion operators make every A-world lower ranked than ev-
ery ¬A-world, while preserving the ordering within each
of [[A]] and [[¬A]], so that x Ψ∗A y iff: (i) x ∈ [[A]] and
y ∈ [[¬A]], or (ii) (x ∈ [[A]] iff y ∈ [[A]]) and x Ψ y.
Natural revision operators, however, fail to satisfy (P∗) and
are thus not members of the family of admissible revision
1Note the use of the plural here: we speak of re-
strained/lexicographic operators. It is of course customary, in the
literature, to refer to the restrained/lexicographic operator. How-
ever, this way of speaking is only appropriate to the extent that
belief states are identifiable with TPOs.
operators. These operators simply promote the minimal A-
worlds to be Ψ∗A-minimal, while leaving everything else
unchanged, so that x Ψ∗A y iff: (i) x ∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]), or
(ii) x, y /∈ min(Ψ, [[A]]) and x Ψ y.
3 Two principles of non-prioritised revision
The DP postulates, as well as (P∗), constrain the relation
between a prior conditional belief set on the one hand, and
a posterior one on the other. But one might wonder what
kinds of constraints govern the relation between two poste-
rior conditional belief sets obtained from a common prior
by different revisions.
To the best of our knowledge, the only two articles to con-
sider principles of this nature are (Booth and Meyer 2011)
and, more briefly, (Schlechta, Lehmann, and Magidor 1996).
In the former, a slightly more general form of the following
pair of syntactic principles is discussed:
(β1+∗) If A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(β2+∗) If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
whose semantic counterparts are given by:
(β1+∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y Ψ∗A x, then
y Ψ∗C x
(β2+∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then
y ≺Ψ∗C x
On the relative plausibility interpretation of , the latter can
be informally glossed as follows: if (i) there exists some po-
tential evidence, consistent with a world x but not with a
world y, such that x would be considered no more plausible
than (respectively: strictly less plausible than) y after receiv-
ing it, then (ii) there is no potential evidence whatsoever that
would lead x to be considered more plausible than (respec-
tively: at least as plausible as) y.
It is easy to see that, on the assumption that Ψ∗>=Ψ
(which follows from (C1∗)), these respectively generalise
(C3∗) and (C4
∗
), which correspond to the special cases in
which C is a tautology.
These postulates can be interpreted in a number of ways.
One way is in terms of the binary relations (over consistent
sentences in L) of overrules and strictly overrules (Booth
and Meyer 2011). We say B overrules A (in Ψ) iff A 6∈
[(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], while B strictly overrules A (in Ψ) iff ¬A ∈
[(Ψ∗A)∗B].2 Then (β1+∗) says that, ifB overrulesA in Ψ,
then A will not be believed following any sequence of two
revisions starting in Ψ ending with B, while (β2+∗) says
that, if B strictly overrules A in Ψ, then A will be rejected
following any such sequence of two revisions.
We noted above that it was a more general form of
(β1+∗), (β2+∗) and their semantic counterparts that inter-
ested Booth & Meyer. The reason for this is that their topic
of interest was not in fact ∗, but rather a more general kind of
operator: a non-prioritised “revision” operator ◦, which does
2Incidentally, the first relation also corresponds to the condition
under which Chandler (2017) proposed that one takesB to provide
a reason to not believe A. The second relation is related to the con-
dition under which he claimed one takes B to provide a reason to
believe ¬A (Chandler 2013).
not necessarily satisfy the Success postulate. They showed
that these operators could be represented as relating belief
states to which a certain type of structure is associated. We
provide in what follows a brief overview of their framework.
First, some key definitions:
Definition 1. ≤ is a proper ordinal interval (POI) assign-
ment to W iff it is a relation over W± = {wi | w ∈
W and i ∈ {−,+}} such that:
(≤ 1) ≤ is a TPO
(≤ 2) x+ < x−
(≤ 3) x+ ≤ y+ iff x− ≤ y−.
Definition 2. Where  is a TPO over W and ≤ is a POI
assignment toW , we say that≤ is faithful to iff it satisfies:
(≤ 4) x+ ≤ y+ iff x  y.
Booth & Meyer then assumed that each belief state Ψ is
associated, not only with a TPO Ψ, but with a POI as-
signment ≤Ψ that is faithful to it (they remained agnostic
as to whether states are to be identified with POI assign-
ments; we will follow suit). This assignment was then taken
to determine the agent’s posterior TPO upon revision by A,
i.e. Ψ◦A, in the following manner:
Definition 3. ◦ is a non-prioritised POI revision operator iff
◦ is a function from state-sentence pairs to states, such that
for every state Ψ there is a POI assignment ≤Ψ such that,
for any sentence A, x Ψ◦A y iff rA(x) ≤Ψ rA(y), where
rA(x) =
{
x+ if x ∈ [[A]]
x− if x ∈ [[¬A]].
General forms of our principles (β1+∗) and (β2+
∗
) turn
out to play a key role in this model. Indeed, Booth & Meyer
(2011, Theorem 1) show that ◦ is a non-prioritised POI revi-
sion operator if and only if it satisfies (C1◦), (C2
◦
), (P
◦
),
(β1+◦) and (β2+
◦
), where these principles are obtained
from their counterparts for (prioritised) revision in the obvi-
ous manner, by substituting the ◦ symbol for ∗.
Non-prioritised POI revision operators can helpfully be
understood diagrammatically. Figure 1 represents a proper
ordinal interval assignment that is faithful to x ≺Ψ y ≺Ψ z.
The left and right interval endpoints respectively represent
the positive (·)+ and negative (·)− counterparts of each
world. Figure 2 represents, by means of the filled circles, the
TPO resulting from the corresponding non-prioritised revi-
sion by y ∨ z, i.e., x ∼Ψ◦y∨z y ≺Ψ◦y∨z z. It also illustrates
failure of Success, since x ∈ min(Ψ◦y∨z,W ).
x
y
z
Figure 1: proper ordinal in-
terval assignment
x
y
z
Figure 2: posterior TPO af-
ter non-prioritised POI re-
vision by y ∨ z
We note that lexicographic revision operators are special
cases of this family in which x+ <Ψ y− for all x, y ∈W .
4 The principles in a prioritised setting
In spite of their arguable appropriateness in a non-prioritised
setting, (β1+∗) and (β2+
∗
) prove to be problematically
strong when one imposes Success.
For one, it turns out that, in such a context the only kind
of operators satisfying (β1+∗) are lexicographic revision
operators, and hence that (β1+∗) imposes the reductionist
assumption that we have suggested is objectionable. Indeed:
Theorem 1. Let ∗ be a revision operator satisfying AGM
and (β1+∗). Then it also satisfies the Recalcitrance prop-
erty (Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003):
(Rec∗) If A ∧B is consistent, then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B].
Proof: If A ∧B is consistent, then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∧B) ∗B]
from AGM. Then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] by (β1+∗). 3
Since we know (see, e.g., (Booth and Meyer 2011; Nayak,
Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003)), that lexicographic revi-
sion operators are the only admissible operators satisfying
(Rec∗), we obtain the following corollary, which also gives
us an alternative characterisation of lexicographic revision:
Corollary 1. The only operators satisfying AGM, (C1∗),
(C2∗) and (β1+∗) are lexicographic revision operators.4
These principles also face a class of direct counterexamples
that match the following general pattern: A provides a de-
feasible reason to believe ¬B (for example, let B = ‘She
missed the target at 5 yards’ and A = ‘She is a pro archer’)
and C is equivalent to the conjunction of A and a defeater
for A’s support for ¬B (for example, let C = ‘She is a pro
archer but isn’t wearing her glasses’). Under these condi-
tions, it can plausibly be the case that ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]
but A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B], contradicting both principles.
This negative result raises the following question: Is there
any way to weaken (β1+∗) and (β2+
∗
) to allow a wider,
but intuitively plausible family of iterated prioritised revi-
sion operators? The answer, as we will now show, is ‘yes’.
5 Success via naturalisation
The guiding idea in what follows is to take the family of
operators discussed in the section before last and ensure sat-
isfaction of Success, not by adding the principle to the list
of characteristic postulates but rather by minimally trans-
forming the TPO associated with the posterior belief state
by means of an operation analogous to natural revision.
More precisely, the proposal is to define ∗ as the com-
position of a non-prioritised POI revision operator ◦ and a
natural revision operator  :
Ψ∗A=(Ψ◦A)A
Recalling the definition of natural revision in Section 2, we
can equivalently say:
3Assuming consistency of inputs, the implication would also
run the other way, yielding equivalence of (Rec∗) and (β1+∗).
4What about (β2+∗)? Lexicographic revision satisfies it triv-
ially, since it satisfies: If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], then x ≺Ψ∗A y.
We can analogously show that it implies, given AGM, the fol-
lowing weakening of (Rec∗): If A ∧ B is consistent, then ¬A /∈
[(Ψ∗A)∗B]. But this is too weak to allow us to recover (Rec∗) and
indeed, (β2+∗) is not uniquely satisfied by lexicographic revision.
Definition 4. ∗ is a naturalisation of ◦ iff:
x Ψ∗A y iff either
(i) x ∈ min(Ψ◦A, [[A]]), or
(ii) x, y /∈ min(Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and x Ψ◦A y.
We use N(∗, ◦) to denote the fact that this relation obtains
between the two functions.
Definition 5. ∗ is a proper interval order (POI) revision op-
erator iff N(∗, ◦) for some non-prioritised POI revision op-
erator ◦.
This kind of suggestion generalises one that was made in
(Booth and Meyer 2006), in which restrained revision oper-
ators were shown to be naturalisations of a particular class
of non-prioritised revision operators due to Papini (2001).
Indeed, the latter satisfy: x Ψ◦A y iff (a) x ≺Ψ y or (b)
x ∼Ψ y and [x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]]]. These conditions,
of course, simply correspond to (ii)(a) and (ii)(b) in the def-
inition of restrained revision operators given in Section 2.
The proposal is also somewhat reminiscent of the manner in
which the Levi Identity (Levi 1977) treats non-iterated revi-
sion as the composition of a contraction and an expansion
([Ψ ∗A] = [Ψ÷¬A] +A), with our natural revision step 
playing the role of the expansion step +.
states
POIs
TPOs
sets
Ψ
≤Ψ
Ψ
[Ψ]
Ψ ◦A
≤Ψ◦A
Ψ◦A
[Ψ ◦A]
Ψ ∗A
≤Ψ∗A
Ψ∗A
[Ψ ∗A]
◦A A
∗A
Figure 3: functional dependencies in POI revision
Figure 3 provides a general overview of the model, with
the various arrows denoting functional determination. From
bottom to top, each belief state Ψ is mapped onto a POI
≤Ψ. This POI determines a TPO Ψ, such that x Ψ y
iff x+ ≤Ψ y+. Finally the TPO in turn determines a belief
set [Ψ], such that A ∈ [Ψ] iff min(,W ) ⊆ [[A]]. These
mappings are potentially many-to-one, so that we obtain in-
creasingly coarse descriptions of an agent’s beliefs as one
moves upwards. From left to right, the function ◦ maps the
prior belief state Ψ onto an ‘intermediate’ state Ψ ◦ A, be-
fore the function  maps the latter onto the posterior state
Ψ ∗A = (Ψ ◦A)A.
We have used dashed arrows to denote some further func-
tional dependencies. The constraints of (Booth and Meyer
2011) ensure that the prior POI assignment ≤Ψ determines
the ‘intermediate’ TPO Ψ◦A. Finally, the constraints oper-
ating on the function  ensure that this in turn determines
the posterior TPO Ψ∗A.
This last step is achieved by moving the Ψ◦A-minimal
A-worlds to the front of the ordering. Figure 4 represents the
result of naturalising the posterior TPO depicted in Figure 2,
with y being moved into the leftmost position.
x
y
z
Figure 4: posterior TPO after naturalisation
The naturalisation step ensures that we have B ∈ [Ψ ∗A] iff
min(Ψ, [[A]]) ⊆ [[B]], so AGM will now clearly be satis-
fied, including Success. Furthermore, the following general
fact about naturalisation establishes that the set of POI revi-
sion operators is a subset of the set of admissible operators:
Proposition 1. For any iterated revision operators ◦ and ∗,
such that N(∗, ◦), if ◦ satisfies (Eq◦), (C1◦), (C2◦) and
(P◦), then ∗ will satisfy (Eq∗), (C1∗), (C2∗) and (P∗).
Indeed, we have already noted that non-prioritised POI revi-
sion operators satisfy (C1◦), (C2
◦
) and (P
◦
). Furthermore,
Booth & Meyer show that they also satisfy (Eq◦).
The family of POI revision operators includes some fa-
miliar figures:
Proposition 2. Both lexicographic and restrained revision
operators are POI revision operators.
Indeed, we have pointed out, at the end of Section 3, that lex-
icographic revision operators are themselves non-prioritised
POI revision operators. Furthermore, since they satisfy Suc-
cess, they will be identical with their own naturalisations.
Regarding restrained revision operators, the result was es-
tablished in Proposition 14 of (Booth and Meyer 2006): they
are, as we noted above, naturalisations of Papini’s ‘reverse’
lexicographic revision operators, which are non-prioritised
POI revision operators.
6 Two weaker principles
It is easy to see that neither (β1+∗), nor (β2+
∗
) are gen-
erally satisfied by POI revision operators. Indeed, let W =
{x, y, z} and ≤Ψ be given as follows: z+ < y+ < z− <
y− < x+ < x−. Then y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x, but x ≺Ψ∗x y. How-
ever, as we shall see from Proposition 6 in the next section,
we do nevertheless obtain the following weakened versions
of these principles, which incorporate into their antecedents
the further requirement that x 6∈ min(, [[C]]):
(β1∗) If x 6∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], and
y Ψ∗A x, then y Ψ∗C x
(β2∗) If x 6∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], and
y ≺Ψ∗A x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x
Regarding the syntactic counterparts of these principles:
Proposition 3. (a) Given AGM, (β1∗) is equivalent to:
(β1∗) If A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] and B → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
then A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(b) Given AGM, (β2∗) is equivalent to:
(β2∗) If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] and B → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
then ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
These principles are particularly interesting insofar as they
avoid the kind of counterexample to (β1+∗) and (β2+
∗
)
that we raised earlier. Indeed, in the scenarios in question,
we also intuitively have B → ¬A /∈ [Ψ ∗ C], rendering
them perfectly consistent with the weaker (β1∗) and (β2∗).
It will turn out to be useful, in the final sections of the
paper, to have noted the following equivalent formulations
of (β1∗) and (β2
∗
):
Proposition 4. (a) Given (C2∗) and (C4∗), (β1∗) is equiv-
alent to the conjunction of the following two principles:
(γ1∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y Ψ∗A x, then
y Ψ∗A∨C x
(γ3∗) If x /∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]],
y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]], and y Ψ∗A∨C x,
then y Ψ∗C x.
(b) Given (C1∗) and (C3∗), (β2∗) is equivalent to the con-
junction of the following two principles:
(γ2∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then
y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x
(γ4∗) If x /∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A ∨ C]],
y ∈ [[¬(A ∨ C)]] and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x,
then y ≺Ψ∗C x.
Note that, given the assumption that Ψ∗>=Ψ, which
follows from (C1∗), (γ1
∗
) and (γ2
∗
) respectively entail
(C3∗) and (C4
∗
) (let C = ¬A). However, none of these
four new principles, and hence neither of (β1∗) and (β2
∗
),
are generally sound for admissible operators:
Proposition 5. None of (γ1∗) to (γ4∗) follows from AGM,
(C1∗), (C2
∗
) and (P
∗
) alone.
7 Characterisations of POI operators
We have now identified a number of sound principles for the
class of POI revision operators, which, we would like to re-
mind the reader, subsumes both restrained and lexicographic
operators. Next, we would like to characterise it.
7.1 Semantic characterisation
For our semantic characterisation, we need to introduce
three more postulates, the first two of which are respective
strengthenings of (β1∗) and (β2
∗
), which can be recovered
by setting z = y:
(α1∗) If x 6∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]],
z Ψ y and y Ψ∗A x, then z Ψ∗C x
(α2∗) If x 6∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]],
z Ψ y and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then z ≺Ψ∗C x
(α3∗) If x 6∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]],
z ≺Ψ y and y Ψ∗A x, then z ≺Ψ∗C x
Proposition 6. (α1∗), (α2∗) and (α3∗) are satisfied by
POI revision operators.
These principles can perhaps be viewed as qualified pseudo-
‘transitivity’ principles, if one ignores the subscripts. (α1∗)
and (α2∗) amount to the conjunctions of (β1
∗
) and (β2
∗
)
with the following semantic postulates, respectively:
(β3∗) If z 6= y, x /∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]],
z Ψ y, and y Ψ∗A x, then z Ψ∗C x
(β4∗) If z 6= y, x /∈ min(, [[C]]), x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]],
z Ψ y, and y ≺Ψ∗A x, then z ≺Ψ∗C x
So Proposition 6 shows that (β1∗) and (β2
∗
)–and hence, in
view of Proposition 4, (γ1∗) to (γ4
∗
)–are sound for POI re-
vision operators. We can now present our main result, which
is a semantic characterisation of the family:
Theorem 2. ∗ is a POI revision operator iff it satisfies AGM,
(Eq∗), (C1
∗
), (C2
∗
), (P
∗
), (α1
∗
), (α2
∗
), and (α3
∗
).
In conjunction with the results of Booth & Meyer regarding
non-prioritised POI revision operators, Propositions 1 and
6 establish the left-to-right direction of the above claim. For
the other direction we need to show that, if ∗ satisfies the rel-
evant semantic properties, then there exists a non-prioritised
POI revision operator ◦ such that N(∗, ◦). The construc-
tion works as follows: From ∗, define ◦ by setting, for all
x, y ∈ W , x Ψ◦A y iff x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. Given (Eq∗),
(C1∗) and (C2
∗
) this is equivalent to:
x Ψ◦A y iff
 x Ψ y if x ∼
A y
x Ψ∗¬y y if x /A y
x Ψ∗¬x y if y /A x
where (i) x EA y iff x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]], (ii) x ∼A y iff
x EA y and y EA x, (iii) x /A y iff x EA y but not y EA x.
A detailed outline of the proof is given in the appendix.
7.2 Two syntactic characterisations
In this part we offer two different syntactic characterisations
of the family of POI revision operators. The first involves
the following postulates:
(Ω1∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B] and A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B],
then B 6∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A]
(Ω2∗) If ¬A 6∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B] and ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B],
then ¬B ∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A]
(Ω3∗) If ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨B] and A 6∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B],
then ¬B ∈ [(Ψ ∗B) ∗A]
These principles admit an interpretation in terms of the no-
tions of overruling and strictly overruling that we introduced
in connection with (β1+∗) and (β2+∗). Indeed, (Ω1∗) and
(Ω2∗) stipulate conditions under which the obtaining of
these relations entail that of their converses, while (Ω3∗) of-
fers a condition that is sufficient for B’s overruling A to en-
tail A’s strictly overruling B.
We remark that, for both lexicographic and restrained op-
erators, it can be shown that the overrules and strictly over-
rules relations collapse into the same relation. Furthermore,
for lexicographic revision, we have that B overrules A iff
A ∧ B is inconsistent (cf. the postulate (Rec∗) in Theo-
rem 1), while, for restrained revision, B overrules A iff both
¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗B] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗A] (i.e., iff A and B counter-
act, to use the terminology from (Booth and Meyer 2006)).
Clearly, in both cases, the overrules relation is symmetric,
and so unrestricted versions of (Ω1∗)-(Ω3∗) hold for these
two sets of operators.
With Proposition 2 in mind, we now offer:
Proposition 7. Given AGM, the following are equivalent:
(a) (Eq∗), (C1
∗
), (C2
∗
), (P
∗
), (α1
∗
)–(α3
∗
), and (b)
(Eq∗), (C1∗), (C2∗), (β1∗), (β2∗), (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗).
While it employs some fairly accessible principles, this first
characterisation ‘bundles’ the contribution of (P∗) into the
principles (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗). For this reason, we offer a sec-
ond characterisation that separates out the contributions and
maps each characteristic semantic principle onto a corre-
sponding syntactic counterpart. Indeed, it turns out that the
exact syntactic counterparts of (β3∗), (β4
∗
), and (α3
∗
) are
given as follows, where Y denotes exclusive OR:
Proposition 8. (a) Given AGM, (β3∗) is equivalent to
(β3∗) If B2 /∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 → A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2],
and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
then B2 ∧A /∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2].
(b) Given AGM and (C4∗), (β4∗) is equivalent to:
(β4∗) If B2 /∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 ∧ ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2],
and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
then B2 → ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2].
(c) Given AGM and (C3∗), (α3∗) is equivalent to:
(α3∗) If ¬B2 ∈ [Ψ ∗B1], B1 → A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B2],
and B2 → ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ C],
then B2 → ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B1 YB2].
Since we already have syntactic counterparts for (β1∗) and
(β2∗), as well as (P
∗
), the above result completes a second
syntactic characterisation of the POI family. This one-to-one
correspondence between semantic and syntactic principles,
however, comes at a cost, since we note that (α1∗)–(α3∗)
are clearly much harder to interpret than (Ω1∗)–(Ω3∗).
8 Iterated versions of AGM era postulates
In this final section of the paper, we investigate various
further properties of POI revision operators, discussing in
the process an interesting issue that has somewhat been ne-
glected in the literature: the extension, to the iterated case,
of the various AGM era postulates for revision.
8.1 Some postulates that are sound
In Section 6, we briefly noted that (β1∗) and (β2
∗
) could
each be reformulated as the conjunction of a pair of princi-
ples. We showed that these principles, which had not been
discussed in the literature to date, are not generally satisfied
by admissible revision operators. It turns out, furthermore,
that they are particularly noteworthy, since we can show that,
in various combinations, they enable us to recover iterated
generalisations of the following strong AGM postulates for
revision and related well-known principles:
(K7∗) [Ψ ∗A ∧ C] ⊆ Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {C})
(DR∗) [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] ⊆ [Ψ ∗A] ∪ [Ψ ∗ C]
(DO∗) [Ψ ∗A] ∩ [Ψ ∗ C] ⊆ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C]
(DI∗) If ¬A /∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then [Ψ ∗A ∨ C] ⊆ [Ψ ∗A]
(K7∗) is one of the two ‘supplementary’ AGM postulates,
and is also known as ‘Superexpansion’. ‘DR’, ‘DO’ and ‘DI’
respectively abbreviate ‘Disjunctive Rationality’, ‘Disjunc-
tive Overlap’ and ‘Disjunctive Inclusion’. As is well known
in the literature, given the other AGM postulates, (DR∗) is a
consequence of the second supplementary postulate (K8∗),
aka ‘Subexpansion’, while (DO∗) is equivalent to (K7∗)
and (DI∗) to (K8∗).
The iterated generalisations that we recover are obtained
by replacing all mentions of the belief states in the principles
above by that of their corresponding revisions by a common
sentence B and making some minor adjustments. In each
case, assuming Success and [Ψ ∗ >] = [Ψ], setting B = >
enables us to recover the non-iterated counterpart. We have:
(iK7∗) [(Ψ ∗A ∧ C) ∗B] ⊆
Cn([(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∪ {A ∧ C})
(iDR∗) [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] ⊆
[(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∪ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(iDO∗) [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B] ⊆
[(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B]
(iDI∗) If ¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B],
then [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
Although (iK7∗) and (iDI∗) are, to the best of our knowl-
edge, new to the literature, we note that (iDR∗) and
(iDO∗) were already discussed and endorsed by Schlechta
et al (1996). Our results are the following.
Proposition 9. In the presence of AGM, (C1∗) and (C2∗),
(a) (γ1∗) and (γ4∗) jointly entail (iDO
∗) and (b) (γ2∗)
and (γ3∗) jointly entail (iDR
∗).
Proposition 10. Given AGM and (C1∗), (a) (γ1∗) is equiv-
alent to (iDI∗) and (b) (γ2∗) is equivalent to (iK7∗).
Before moving on to the next subsection, a brief comment is
in order regarding the well-known results, starting with the
work of Ga¨rdenfors (1986), which show that iterated ver-
sions of even the weak ‘basic’ AGM postulates lead to trivi-
ality. How do these results square with our claims to recover
iterated versions of various postulates that are substantially
stronger? The answer lies in a difference in the approach to
generalising these principles. In the literature surrounding
the triviality results, the generalisations were obtained by
replacing all references to belief sets by references to corre-
sponding conditional belief sets. But this way of proceeding
yields a significantly different set of generalisations to ours.
To illustrate, consider the following ‘basic’ AGM postulate,
which is a weakening of (K7∗) :
(K3∗) [Ψ ∗A] ⊆ Cn([Ψ] ∪ {A})
In triviality result literature, however, its iterated counter-
part is: [Ψ ∗A]c ⊆ Cn([Ψ]c ∪ {A}). Etlin (2009) shows this
principle to play badly with a pair of principles of condi-
tional logic that he argues to be plausible. On our method
for generating generalisations, however, we obtain the fol-
lowing weakening of our (iK7∗):
(iK3∗) [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ⊆ Cn([Ψ ∗B] ∪ {A})
This principle is insufficiently strong to play the required
role in the derivations of triviality and simply turns out to be
a consequence of the DP postulates.5
8.2 Some postulates that are not sound
We have not recovered the iterated version of Subexpansion:
(K8∗) If ¬C /∈ [Ψ ∗A], then Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {C}) ⊆
[Ψ ∗A ∧ C]
which is given by:
(iK8∗) If ¬(A ∧ C) /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B], then
Cn([(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] ∪ {A ∧ C}) ⊆
[(Ψ ∗A ∧ C) ∗B]
For this, we consider the following rather strong principle:
(P+∗) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x Ψ∗A∨C y, then
x ≺Ψ∗A y
This principle strengthens the conjunction of (γ1∗) and
(γ2∗) in much the same way that (P
∗
) strengthens the con-
junction of (C3∗) and (C4
∗
) (which, recall, are respective
weakenings of (γ1∗) and (γ2
∗
)). Taken contrapositively,
the principle inherits the weak antecedent of (γ1∗) but the
strong consequent of (γ2∗). Given Ψ∗>=Ψ, which fol-
lows from (C1∗), (P
∗
) is recovered as the special case of
(P+∗) in which C = ¬A. We now note:
Proposition 11. (iK8∗) is equivalent, given AGM and
(C1∗), to the conjunction of (γ1
∗
) and (P+
∗
).
Where does our POI family stand with respect to this princi-
ple? Well we can establish the following:
Proposition 12. (P+∗) is satisfied by both lexicographic
and restrained revision operators.
Since lexicographic and restrained revision operators satisfy
(γ1+∗), this establishes, that they satisfy (iK8
∗). This is
interesting, since it shows, not only that the principle is con-
sistent with our previous constraints, but that adding it to
these does not yield the kind of ‘reductionism’ that has been
argued to be objectionable. However, it remains the case that
Proposition 13. (P+∗) is not generally satisfied by POI
revision operators.
In fact, a weaker property than this one fails to hold across
the family. Indeed, (P+∗) generalises the following Separa-
tion property, discussed by Booth & Meyer (2006) under the
name of ‘UR’, the special case of (P+∗) in which C = A:
(Sep∗) If x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], then x ≺Ψ∗A y or
y ≺Ψ∗A x
5More specifically, it follows from (C1∗) and (C4∗). Note that
(C1∗) and (C3∗) enable us to also recover the following iterated
version of ‘Preservation’, which, given the other AGM postulates,
is equivalent, in its non-iterated form, to (K4∗): (iPres∗) If ¬A /∈
[Ψ ∗B], then [Ψ ∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]. If one adds (P∗) to these
principles, one also recovers the corresponding iterated version of
(K4∗): (iK4∗) If ¬A /∈ [Ψ∗B], then Cn([Ψ∗B]∪{A}) ⊆ [(Ψ∗
A)∗B]. We omit the proofs here, since these claims are not central
to our discussion. (iK3∗) and (iPres∗) are respective weakenings
of (iK7∗) and (iDI∗). (iK4∗) is a weakening of the iterated version
of Subexpansion, (iK8∗), discussed in the next section.
This principle can be captured by a ‘Non-Flush’ constraint
on the POI assignment, which states that it is never the case
that two intervals line up flush, in the sense that x+ ∼ y−.
This condition is not satisfied in general by POI assign-
ments. Indeed, consider the following assignment to W =
{x, y, z}: x+ < y+ < x− < y− ∼ z+ < z−. Non-Flush
fails, with the result that so too does (Sep∗) fails, and hence
so does (P+∗), since y ∼Ψ∗x∨z z. This establishes Propo-
sition 13.
At this point, a natural question arises: Why has the nar-
rower family of POI revision operators satisfying (Sep∗), or
indeed, (P+∗), not made a more central appearance in the
present paper? The answer to this is that (Sep∗) remains in
our view an extremely strong property. This becomes most
apparent when one considers its syntactic counterpart:
(Sep∗) Either ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] or A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
This principle states that, once one has revised one’s be-
liefs by a certain sentence, one will remain opinionated as
to whether or not that sentence is true upon any further sin-
gle revision. But this seems too strong: letA be any sentence
and B be the sentence ‘The Oracle says that it might not be
the case that A’. Plausibly A,¬A /∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B].
Also of interest is the iterated version of ‘Disjunctive Fac-
toring’, which is equivalent to the conjunction of (K7∗) and
(K8∗), in the presence of the other AGM postulates:6
(DF∗) (i) If ¬C ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then
[Ψ ∗A ∨ C] = [Ψ ∗A]
(ii) If ¬A,¬C /∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then
[Ψ ∗A ∨ C] = [Ψ ∗A] ∩ [Ψ ∗ C]
(iii) If ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗A ∨ C], then
[Ψ ∗A ∨ C] = [Ψ ∗ C]
The iterated version is given by:
(iDF∗) (i) If ¬C ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then
[(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] = [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
(ii) If ¬A,¬C /∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then
[(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] = [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B]
∩[(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(iii) If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B], then
[(Ψ ∗A ∨ C) ∗B] = [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗B]
(iDF∗)(ii) is entailed by the combination of (iDO∗), for the
right-to-left direction, and (iDI∗), for the left-to-right direc-
tion, both of which we have established to be sound for POI
revision operators. Regarding (iDF∗)(i):
Proposition 14. The semantic counterparts of the right-to-
left and left-to-right directions of (iDF∗)(i) are respectively:
(γ5∗) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]] and y Ψ∗A∨C x, then y Ψ∗C x
(γ6∗) If y ∈ [[¬A]], and y ≺Ψ∗A∨C x, then y ≺Ψ∗C x.
We note that the second of these two principles, in conjunc-
tion with (γ2∗), obviously gives us (β2+
∗
). However, due
to the requirement that x ∈ [[¬A]] in the antecedent of the
6This condition is typically stated in weaker terms, as: [Ψ∗A∨
C] is equal to either [Ψ∗A], [Ψ∗C], or [Ψ∗A]∩ [Ψ∗C]. However,
the equivalence that is proven is in fact with the stronger principle.
See (Ga¨rdenfors 1988, Proposition 3.16).
second principle, the latter does not give us (β1+∗), in con-
junction with (γ1∗). Where do they stand in relation to our
family of operators? The answer is the following:
Proposition 15. Neither (γ5∗) nor (γ6∗) are generally sat-
isfied by POI revision operators.
However:
Proposition 16. Both (γ5∗) and (γ6∗) are satisfied by lex-
icographic revision operators.
This establishes that (iDF∗) is satisfied by lexicographic re-
vision operators, since we have individually shown that they
satisfy all the component principles.
9 Conclusions and further work
This paper has investigated a significant, yet comparatively
restrained, strengthening of the seminal framework intro-
duced two decades ago by Darwiche and Pearl. Unlike
the majority of existing models of iterated revision, ours
falls short of identifying belief states with simple total pre-
orders over worlds. Indeed, it incorporates further structure
into these, in the form of proper ordinal intervals.7 This is
achieved by combining Booth & Meyer’s framework for
non-prioritised revision with a ‘naturalisation’ step. The re-
sulting family of POI revision operators, which is a sub-
family of the so-called ‘admissible’ family, has been charac-
terised both semantically and syntactically. It has also been
shown that POI revision operators are distinctive, within the
class of admissible ones, in satisfying iterated counterparts
of many (albeit not all) classic AGM era postulates.
In future work, we first plan to consider the consequences
of relaxing (P∗). This condition fails for a more general
family of ‘basic ordinal interval (BOI)’ revision operators.
These operators, which include natural revision operators,
are naturalisations of non-prioritised operators based on or-
dinal interval assignments that satisfy, not (≤ 2), but the
weaker requirement that x+ ≤ x−. As it turns out, our proof
of the soundness of (α1∗)–(α3
∗
) with respect to POI op-
erators carries over here, leaving us in a strong position to
provide a characterisation for this more general family. Sec-
ondly, as Figure 3 reminds us, the constraints that we have
discussed impose few constraints on the result of more than
two iterations of the revision operation. While the structure
associated with belief states currently determines the poste-
rior TPO, nothing has been said regarding the nature of the
posterior POI.
7Others have also enriched belief states beyond mere TPOs
or equivalent structures. Spohn, for instance, identifies states with
‘ranking functions’, aka ‘OCFs’ (Spohn 1988; 2012). Others, such
as Konieczny & Pe´rez (2000) identify states with histories of in-
put sentences (see also (Lehmann 1995) and (Delgrande, Dubois,
and Lang 2006) for related work). However, the comparison with
Spohn’s approach is not straightforward, since his model features
a whole parameterised family of revision-like functions. Regarding
Konieczny & Pe´rez’s model, if (C2∗) is imposed, then their pro-
posal reduces to lexicographic revision.
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Appendix
Theorem 2. ∗ is a POI revision operator iff it satisfies AGM,
(Eq∗), (C1
∗
), (C2
∗
), (P
∗
), (α1
∗
), (α2
∗
), and (α3
∗
).
Detailed proof sketch: As remarked earlier, soundness fol-
lows from the results of Booth & Meyer and Propositions 1
and 6. For the completeness part, let ◦ be defined from ∗ as
it was just after Theorem 2 in the main text. We establish the
result by proving two main lemmas: first, we show that ◦ is
a non-prioritised POI revision operator (Lemma 1) and then
we show that N(∗, ◦) (Lemma 3).
Lemma 1. ◦ is a non-prioritised POI revision operator
We show that ◦ satisfies each of (C1◦), (C2◦), (P◦),
(β1+◦) and (β2+
◦
), as well as the requirement that Ψ◦A
is a TPO over W .
The main difficulty lies in establishing the soundness of
this last property. To do this we will use the following useful
auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 2. Let x, y, z be distinct worlds such that y Ψ z.
Then the following are equivalent: (i) If x Ψ∗¬y y, then
x Ψ∗¬z z, and (ii) If x Ψ∗x∨z y, then x Ψ∗x∨y z.
Totality of Ψ◦A follows from totality of Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) and
(Eq∗), since we have x Ψ◦A y ⇔ x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y.
To show that Ψ◦A is transitive, we consider the eight cases
according to whether each of x, y, and z is in [[A]] or not:
(i) x, y, z ∈ [[A]] or x, y, z ∈ [[¬A]]: Follows from transi-
tivity for ∗.
(ii) x, y ∈ [[A]], z ∈ [[¬A]]: Then we must show that, if
x Ψ y and y Ψ∗¬z z, then x Ψ∗¬z z. Since
x, y ∈ [[A]] and z ∈ [[¬A]], we know that x 6= z and
y 6= z. Then from x Ψ y and (C1∗), we obtain
x Ψ∗¬z y. From the latter and y Ψ∗¬z z, we then
obtain x Ψ∗¬z z by transitivity for ∗.
(iii) x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]], z ∈ [[A]]: Then we must show
that, if x Ψ∗¬y y and y Ψ∗¬y z, then x Ψ z.
By transitivity for ∗, it follows, from x Ψ∗¬y y and
y Ψ∗¬y z, that x Ψ∗¬y z. From x, z ∈ [[A]] and
y ∈ [[¬A]], we know x 6= y and z 6= y. So from
x Ψ∗¬y z and (C1∗), we obtain x Ψ z.
(iv) x ∈ [[A]], y, z ∈ [[¬A]]: Then we must show that, if
x Ψ∗¬y y and y Ψ z, then x Ψ∗¬z z. If z = y,
then x Ψ∗¬z z follows immediately from x Ψ∗¬y
y. So we may assume z 6= y. By Lemma 2, what we
must establish is then equivalent to: if x Ψ∗x∨z y
and y Ψ z, then x Ψ∗x∨y z. Or contraposing: if
z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x and y Ψ z, then y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x. So as-
sume z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x and y Ψ z. Now, if x Ψ z, then
x Ψ∗x∨y z by (C3∗). So assume z ≺Ψ x. We there-
fore have: x ∈ [[x ∨ y]], z /∈ [[x ∨ y]], z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x,
y Ψ z and x /∈ min(, [[x ∨ z]]). From this, by
(α2∗), we can then infer that y ≺Ψ∗x∨z x.
(v) x ∈ [[¬A]], y, z ∈ [[A]]: Then we must show that, if
x Ψ∗¬x y and y Ψ z, then x Ψ∗¬x z. Since
x ∈ [[¬A]] and y, z ∈ [[A]], we know that x 6= y and
x 6= z. Hence from y Ψ z, we know y Ψ∗¬x z.
The implication then follows from transitivity for ∗.
(vi) x ∈ [[¬A]], y ∈ [[A]], z ∈ [[¬A]]: Then we must show
that, if x Ψ∗¬x y and y Ψ∗¬z z, then x Ψ z, or,
equivalently, that, if x Ψ∗¬x y and z ≺Ψ x, then
z ≺Ψ∗¬z y. So suppose x Ψ∗¬x y and z ≺Ψ x. If
y Ψ x, then by (P∗) we would have y ≺Ψ∗¬x x:
contradiction. Hence we may assume x ≺Ψ y. From
this and z ≺Ψ x we have, by transitivity, z ≺Ψ y and
hence y /∈ min(, [[y∨z]]). From this and x Ψ∗¬x y,
using postulate (β1∗), we can deduce x Ψ∗y∨z y.
We therefore have: y ∈ [[y∨z]], x /∈ [[y∨z]], x Ψ∗y∨z
y, z ≺Ψ x and y /∈ min(Ψ, [[x ∨ y]]). From this, by
(α3∗), we can then infer that z ≺Ψ∗x∨y x, and so
z ≺Ψ∗¬z y, by (γ2∗), as required.
(vii) x, y ∈ [[¬A]], z ∈ [[A]]: Then we must show that, if
x Ψ y and y Ψ∗¬y z, then x Ψ∗¬x z. If x = y,
then this holds immediately, so we may assume x 6=
y. Now suppose x Ψ y and y Ψ∗¬y z. If z Ψ y,
then z ≺Ψ∗¬y y by (P∗): contradiction. So we may
assume y ≺Ψ z. From this and x Ψ y, we know, by
transitivity, that x ≺Ψ z, so z /∈ min(Ψ, [[x ∨ z]]). It
then follows that y Ψ∗x∨z z by postulate (β1∗). We
therefore have: z ∈ [[x∨ z]], y /∈ [[x∨ z]], y Ψ∗x∨z z,
x ≺Ψ y and z /∈ min(Ψ, [[y ∨ z]]). From this, by
(α1∗), we can then infer that x ≺Ψ∗y∨z z, and so
x Ψ∗¬x z, by (γ1∗), as required.
We now prove our second main lemma:
Lemma 3. N(∗, ◦)
We require: x Ψ∗A y iff (i) x ∈ min(Ψ◦A, [[A]]), or (ii)
x, y /∈ min(Ψ◦A, [[A]]) and x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. Since ◦
satisfies (C1◦), we can however replace this with: x Ψ∗A
y iff (i) x ∈ min(, [[A]]), or (ii) x, y /∈ min(, [[A]]) and
x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. With this in mind:
(a) Left-to-right direction: Suppose that x Ψ∗A y and
x /∈ min(, [[A]]). If y ∈ min(, [[A]]), then y ≺Ψ∗A x,
by Success: contradiction. Hence y /∈ min(, [[A]]). It
remains to be shown that x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. If x ∼A y,
then the conclusion follows by (C1∗)–(C2
∗
). If y /
Ax,
then the conclusion follows from x Ψ∗A y and (γ1∗).
Finally, if x /A y, then x ∈ [[A ∨ ¬(x ∨ y)]] and y ∈
[[¬(A ∨ ¬(x ∨ y))]]. Together with x /∈ min(Ψ, [[A]])
and x Ψ∗A y, the desired conclusion then follows by
postulate (β2∗).
(b) Right-to-left direction: If x ∈ min(, [[A]]), then
x Ψ∗A y by Success. So suppose x, y /∈ min(, [[A]])
and x Ψ∗A∨¬(x∨y) y. We must show x Ψ∗A y. If
x ∼A y, then the conclusion follows by (C1∗)–(C2∗).
If x/A y, then the conclusion follows by (γ2∗). Finally,
if y /A x, then the conclusion follows from postulate
(β1∗).
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